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So You’ve Been Preempted—What Are You Going to 
Do Now?: Solutions for States Following Federal 
Preemption of State Predatory Lending Statutes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Home ownership is the foundation upon which the “American 
dream” is built; the goal of owning a home remains high on the list 
of priorities for Americans young and old.1 In April 2000, 70.7 
million American families (67.1%) owned their homes, more than 
ever before in our nation’s history.2 Although many factors likely 
contributed to those record levels, the increased availability of 
subprime credit was one important cause;3 the ability of individuals 
with blemished credit histories to obtain credit was never greater. 
The total dollar amount of subprime loans increased fourfold from 
$40 billion in 1994 to $160 billion in 1999,4 with the subprime 
 1. See Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact and Responses: Hearings Before 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 53–54 (2001) 
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa). 
 2. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 1 (2000), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/treasrpt.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) 
[hereinafter TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT]. 
 3. Subprime lending involves lending to individuals who are unable to qualify for the 
best available interest rates (prime rates). “Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit 
histories that include payment delinquencies, and possibly more severe problems such as 
charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies. They may also display reduced repayment capacity as 
measured by credit scores, debt-to-income ratios, or other criteria that may encompass 
borrowers with incomplete credit histories.” BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF 
THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001).
 4. KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME 
MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING vii (2000) (“A number of factors 
accounted for this growth: federal legislation preempting state restrictions on allowable rates 
and loan features, the tax reform act of 1986 [sic], increased demand for and availability of 
consumer debt, and an increase in subprime securitization.”). Another report states that the 
number of subprime loans increased from 80,000 in 1993 to over 790,000 in 1998, with 
subprime loans increasing from a $20 billion portion of the overall mortgage market to a 
$150 billion portion over the same period. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA 
(2000), available at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/subprime.html (last 
visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter UNEQUAL BURDEN]. 
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market comprising “a little more than ten percent of the [overall] 
mortgage market.”5 Although increased subprime lending 
contributed to that encouraging increase in home ownership, not all 
the consequences have been positive. As subprime loan originations 
have increased, so too have “predatory” loan practices.6  
While individuals, consumer groups, state and federal 
government agencies, and state and federal politicians have become 
increasingly concerned about such practices and have called for 
changes in the way mortgage lending is regulated, they do not agree 
on the shape such changes should take.7 In particular, state and 
federal government approaches to the problem are not in accord. 
State and local governments have enacted laws that combat 
predatory loan practices by regulating banks and banking subsidiaries 
 5. AMY CREWS CUTTS & ROBERT A. VAN ORDER, FREDDIE MAC, ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF SUBPRIME LENDING 1 (Freddie Mac, Office of the Chief Economist, 2003). 
 6. See infra Part II.A (explaining what predatory lending is and providing examples of 
such practices). 
 7. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1 (discussing the predatory lending problem and 
various responses to it); Letter from Neil A. Milner, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, to the Honorable John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of 
the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1–11 (March 28, 2003) (opposing 
federal preemption of state predatory lending laws, specifically the Georgia Fair Lending Act, 
and arguing that states have the power to regulate national and state banks); Notice, National 
City Bank, 68 Fed. Reg. 46264 (Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter GFLA Preemption 
Determination] (preempting the Georgia Fair Lending Act as it applies to federally chartered 
banks and concluding that Georgia’s act interferes with national bank real estate lending 
powers). 
One major difficulty in regulating the subprime market is that the subprime market, 
while fertile ground for predatory and unfair lending practices, is also a vital source of credit. 
Regulating the subprime lending market without cutting off access to its credit resources is not 
an easy task. As explained by a witness at congressional hearings held regarding the predatory 
lending issue, “[d]rying up productive credit would be of grave concern; drying up destructive 
debt is sound economic and public policy.” Hearings, supra note 1, at 54 (statement of 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa). A recent Department of Housing and 
Urban Development report described the value of subprime lending, illustrating the 
importance of not damaging or eliminating it through overly intrusive regulation, as follows: 
By providing loans to borrowers who do not meet the credit standards for 
borrowers in the prime market, subprime lending can and does serve a critical role in 
the Nation’s economy. These borrowers may have blemishes in their credit record, 
insufficient credit history or non-traditional credit sources. Through the subprime 
loan market, they can buy a new home, improve their existing home, or refinance 
their mortgage to increase their cash on hand. 
UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 4, at 1. 
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operating within their borders,8 only to have their efforts preempted 
by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).9 For instance, the OCC 
recently issued a preemption order and determination that the 
substantive provisions of the Georgia Fair Lending Act (“GFLA”), 
which prohibits various loan terms and features that the Georgia 
legislature deemed undesirable,10 does not apply to nationally 
chartered banks and their subsidiaries.11 The OCC determination, 
combined with the GFLA’s parity provision (which makes the GFLA 
inapplicable to state banks if a federal regulatory agency determines 
that the GFLA does not apply to nationally chartered banks),12 
makes the GFLA ineffective against all bank lenders in Georgia.13 
These federal regulatory agencies have expressed concern that state 
predatory lending regulations, such as the GFLA, interfere with the 
ability of national financial institutions to regulate real estate 
finance.14 State and local policymakers, however, insist that federal 
laws and regulations are not strict enough.15 As the problem of 
 8. See, e.g., GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7 (preempting the Georgia 
Fair Lending Act as it applies to federally chartered banks); Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2002) (amended 2003). 
 9. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7; Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, 
Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of the Treasury (Jan. 21, 2003) 
(concluding that federal law preempts application of various provisions of the Georgia Fair 
Lending Act to federal savings associations and their operating subsidiaries), at 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56301.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter OTS 
GFLA Preemption Letter]; Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift 
Supervision, Department of the Treasury (July 22, 2003) (concluding that federal law 
preempts application of various provisions of the New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 
2002 to federal savings associations and their operating subsidiaries), at 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56305.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter OTS 
NJHOSA Preemption Letter]. 
 10. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13. 
 11. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7; see also infra Part III. 
 12. See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-12 (stating that the provisions of the GFLA will not 
apply to state-chartered financial institutions to the “extent federal law precludes or preempts 
or has been determined to preclude or preempt the application of the provisions of this chapter 
to any federally chartered bank”). 
 13. See Memorandum from Bo Fears, Assistant Attorney General, State of Georgia, to 
David Sorrell, Commissioner, Department of Banking and Finance, State of Georgia (Aug. 4, 
2003) (explaining that the OCC’s preemption order is a preemption determination within the 
meaning of the GFLA’s parity provision, which, according to the GFLA’s parity provision, 
leads to the conclusion that the GFLA does not apply to state banks). 
 14. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
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predatory lending continues and federal agencies show a willingness 
to preempt state regulations that affect nationally chartered financial 
institutions, states are left with fewer options for protecting at-risk 
consumers in the subprime market. 
This Comment discusses this problem and suggests that states 
may reduce abusive subprime lending, in spite of federal orders 
preempting their legislative and regulatory efforts, by improving 
regulation of nonbank loan sellers and increasing enforcement of 
state deceptive and unfair trade practices acts. Part II defines 
predatory lending, discusses why it is a problem, and briefly recounts 
current federal and state remedies. Part III outlines the reasoning 
behind the OCC’s recent order and determination, which preempts 
the GFLA and sets the stage for future orders preempting state 
predatory lending laws. It also briefly outlines OTC preemption 
orders that have determined that the GFLA and a similar New Jersey 
predatory lending law are not applicable to federally chartered 
savings and thrift associations or their subsidiaries.16 Part IV provides 
two suggested solutions for states seeking to develop effective tactics 
for fighting predatory lending practices without running afoul of 
preemption concerns: the increased regulation of nonbank sellers of 
loans (primarily mortgage brokers who often operate outside federal 
and state regulatory structures), and increased enforcement of state 
deceptive and unfair trade practices acts (such as mini-FTC acts). 
Though many approaches can be taken,17 these remedies address the 
problem effectively, cannot be preempted by federal regulatory 
agencies, and are better suited to address state predatory lending 
problems than blanket federal regulation. They can also be tailored 
to address the needs of various jurisdictions and applied to 
transactions that are truly predatory without restricting access to 
legitimate subprime credit. Part V offers a conclusion.18
 16. See OTS GFLA Preemption Letter, supra note 9; OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter, 
supra note 9. 
 17. Such approaches include heightened federal standards under such laws as the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17 (2000), the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000), increased borrower education, and further 
regulation by state and local legislatures through the enactment of new predatory lending laws. 
 18. This Comment seeks to provide solutions to the predatory lending problem that can 
be followed by state legislators and regulators without fear of preemption by federal law. The 
suggestions made in this Comment are not exhaustive, and additional action may be necessary 
at both state and federal levels to combat abusive lending practices. 
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II. WHAT IS PREDATORY LENDING AND WHY IS IT HARMFUL? 
A. Defining Predatory Lending 
 Defining predatory lending is difficult.19 Any list of predatory 
practices is incomplete because such a “list does not consider the 
context in which the alleged abuse has occurred.”20 Although certain 
lending practices may be abusive when sold as part of a high-cost 
subprime loan if the borrower is deceived or misled, the same 
practices are not abusive in other high-cost situations if the borrower 
understands the otherwise abusive term or practice and the loan is 
negotiated as part of an arms-length transaction.21 When 
determining whether a loan or its terms are predatory, all of the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction must be considered.22
 19. Although defining predatory lending in an objective way is not easy, it helps to 
recognize what predatory lending is not: legitimate subprime lending. Subprime lending is an 
important source of financing for those with imperfect credit and has provided a way for many 
people to become homeowners who would have otherwise been unable. Hearings, supra note 
1, at 311 (statement of John A. Courson, President and CEO, Central Pacific Mortgage 
Company, Folsom, California, on behalf of Mortgage Bankers Association of America) 
(“[Subprime lending] has been extremely beneficial to thousands of families in the last couple 
of years. Subprime lending has opened up new markets and helped many consumers that 
would not have received needed funds but for the special products available in this sector of 
the market. The subprime market provides a legitimate and much needed source of credit for 
many families.”). Subprime lending 
refers to entirely appropriate and legal lending to borrowers who do not qualify for 
prime rates, those rates reserved for borrowers with virtually blemish-free credit 
histories. Premiums for extending credit to these borrowers compensate lenders for 
the increased risk that they incur and range several percentage points over rates 
charged on prime loans. 
Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Address at the Housing Bureau for Seniors Conference, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
speeches/2002/20020118/default.htm. 
 20. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. 
 21. Id. As one commentator stated, 
In its reliance on a ‘I know it when I see it’ kind of test, predatory lending is similar 
to obscenity. Just as two observers may differ over whether a picture is obscene, they 
may also differ over whether a particular practice is abusive. And just as there is no 
end to the sources of obscene expression, there is no end to the list of lending 
practices that could be used in abusive fashion. 
JACK GUTTENTAG, ANOTHER VIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING 5 (Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., 
Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 01-23-B, 2001), available at http://fic.wharton. 
upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0123.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004). 
 22. As explained by one witness at congressional hearings about the predatory lending 
issue, the full context of the transaction must be analyzed to properly assess whether an abuse 
has occurred: 
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In spite of the difficulty in definitively and objectively defining 
predatory lending, some practices are definitely considered predatory 
in certain circumstances. Such practices include aggressive sales 
techniques, deceit, fraud, manipulation, or any number of the 
foregoing, “often combined with loan terms that, alone or in 
combination, are abusive or make the borrower more vulnerable to 
abusive practices.”23 Loan terms and practices that are often 
considered abusive when offered in a “predatory” context include: 
(1) loan “flipping,”24 (2) making loans without considering the 
borrower’s ability to repay and primarily for the purpose of obtaining 
the collateral,25 (3) negative amortization loans,26 (4) the use of 
It is impossible, for example, to identify “excessive” fees without knowing the 
nature and difficulty of the service provided in exchange for that fee. Nor can we 
recognize repeat refinances that are meant to strip equity without looking at the fee 
structure of the transaction and the equity of the consumer. In order to determine 
that a consumer has been “deliberately misled,” we have to study the disclosures and 
the oral representations made in the context of the specific transaction at hand. 
Since every loan is unique and every transaction is tailored to specific needs and 
conditions, the answer of whether mortgage abuse has occurred in any given 
situation is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances of the borrower and 
the transaction. It is daunting, therefore, to isolate the specific “bad acts” that are 
employed by unscrupulous lenders in a way that allows for appropriate regulation. 
Hearings, supra note 1, at 312 (statement of John A. Courson, President and CEO, Central 
Pacific Mortgage Company, Folsom, California, on behalf of Mortgage Bankers Association of 
America). 
 23. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
 24. Loan “flipping” is frequent refinancing done in order to get additional fees or other 
lender-favorable terms that have little or no benefit, economic or otherwise, to the borrower. 
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due 
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 515 (2002) (defining “flipping” as “the early or 
frequent refinancing of a loan, normally with each new set of loan fees financed by the loan, so 
that the loan amount continually rises, even while the homeowner makes her payments”). The 
Treasury-HUD Joint Report also states: 
Loan flipping generally refers to repeated refinancing of a mortgage loan within a 
short period of time with little or no benefit to the borrower. Loan flipping typically 
occurs when borrower [sic] is unable to meet scheduled payments, or repeatedly 
consolidates other unsecured debts into a new, home-secured loan at the urging of a 
lender. Lenders who flip loans tend to charge high origination fees with each 
successive refinancing, and may charge these fees based on the entire amount of the 
new loan, not on just the incremental amount (if any) added to the loan principal 
through the refinancing. 
TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. 
 25. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. This practice, also often 
called “asset-based lending,” was recognized as a problem and condemned by the Treasury-
HUD Joint Report: 
A creditor’s decision on whether to originate a mortgage loan should be guided by 
his/her assessment of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan from liquid sources 
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excessive prepayment penalties,27 (5) balloon payments,28 (6) the use 
of mandatory arbitration clauses,29 (7) fee “packing,”30 and (8) 
(e.g., income and non-housing assets). Other factors, such as the overall size of the 
loan, the borrower’s credit history and the value of the collateral play into the 
decision as well. There is widespread concern, however, that some unscrupulous 
creditors are making loans to borrowers who clearly cannot afford to repay them. . . . 
Lending with no reasonable expectation of repayment other than recourse to the 
underlying collateral is not a practice engaged in by safe and sound lenders. 
Similarly, responsible mortgage brokers do not broker loans to borrowers where the 
borrower can’t repay. Asset-based lending can have significant social implications, 
particularly in home-secured transactions. Borrowers not only risk losing their 
homes to foreclosure, but also their accumulated equity in their homes, a major 
source of wealth for many Americans. 
Id. at 76–77. The OCC also recognizes the problem of asset-based lending, noting that such 
practices are a fundamental characteristic of predatory loans. Abusive loans are often 
“underwritten predominantly on the basis of the liquidation value of the collateral, without 
regard to the borrower’s ability to service and repay the loan according to its terms absent 
resorting to that collateral.” Advisory Letter from the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending 
Practices to Chief Executive Officers of All National Banks and National Bank Operating 
Subsidiaries, Department & Division Heads, and All Examining Personnel 2 (Feb. 21, 2003), 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf [hereinafter OCC Predatory 
Abuses Guidelines Letter]. 
 26. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 91–92. Negative amortization 
loans are loans that are structured so that the borrower pays less than the amount of interest 
due on the loan so that the principal amount of the debt increases. Id. at 91. This causes the 
borrower to lose equity in her home, and “[t]he existence of such a schedule . . . may indicate 
a lack of understanding on the part of the borrower or misleading lender practices.” Id. at 92. 
 27. Prepayment penalties are “fees that are added to the amount the borrower must pay 
to retire a loan before it reaches full term.” Eggert, supra note 24, at 518. Early payment of a 
loan reduces the amount of interest lenders receive on a given loan, and prepayment penalties 
are therefore intended to reduce early payment. Id. “[W]hen employed by predatory lenders, 
prepayment penalties are designed either to trap the borrower, forcing her to remain in an 
inequitable loan, or to reward the lender with an unreasonable payoff when an unwitting 
borrower refinances the loan.” Id. See also TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 
92–96 (discussing prepayment penalties and their effects on borrowers). 
 28. Balloon payments are large payments that are due “at the end of a fixed-rate loan 
term when regular monthly payments do not fully amortize the loan principal.” TREASURY-
HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 96. Such payments “force a borrower at a set time to 
repay all of the remaining balance on a loan rather than continuing to make monthly payments 
until the entire loan has been repaid.” Eggert, supra note 24, at 519. When the balloon 
payment comes due, “borrowers are highly unlikely to be able to pay off a sizeable balloon 
payment without refinancing the loan, thus incurring a new round of points and fees.” Id. 
 29. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 98–99. 
 30. Fee “packing” generally refers to the inclusion of excessive or unnecessary fees and 
points being financed into the loan amount. Eggert, supra note 24, at 517. “‘Packing’ is the 
practice of forcing or inducing borrowers to use some of their loan proceeds to pay for 
unnecessary or undesired products . . . . Predatory lenders try to include as many such products 
as they can, such as insurance to pay off credit card debt or to service home appliances.” Id. 
CHI-FIN 7/16/2004 5:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
708 
 
steering individuals that would otherwise qualify for low-cost prime 
loans into high-cost subprime loans.31 
B. Why Is Predatory Lending a Problem? 
Predatory lending is problematic because predatory lenders often 
seek out those who are least able to deal with the burdens that 
onerous loans impose, such as the elderly and minorities (due to 
economic constraints).32 Additionally, predatory lending, and 
regulatory responses to it, cause disruptions in the secondary market 
Predatory lenders engage in such practices because they directly benefit from receiving higher 
fees and “obtain profits from selling these overpriced products.” Id. 
One product that predatory lenders “pack” into loans and that is often harmful to 
borrowers is single premium credit insurance. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 
2, at 89–90. Upon death or disability of the borrower, credit insurance pays off the balance of 
the mortgage. Id. at 89. Premiums for such insurance are often paid in a lump-sum at closing 
and are financed as part of the loan, increasing finance charges and providing “no actuarial 
benefit to the consumer” since the policy is in effect for only the first few years of the loan. Id. 
at 90. In some cases, 
lenders may mislead consumers into believing that credit insurance is a requirement 
for approval of the loan. An industry-funded report found that 18 percent of those 
surveyed did not remember being told that credit insurance was optional. In some 
instances, borrowers have been unaware that they have purchased credit insurance. 
Even if borrowers understand that they are purchasing the product and do so 
voluntarily, the lender may mislead the consumer into thinking that coverage is for 
the entire life of the mortgage when the policy is only in effect for the first five to 
seven years of the loan. 
Id. 
 31. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1266 (2002). Engel & McCoy would 
describe the practice of steering individuals into higher cost loans as “harmful rent-seeking,” 
which they argue is a defining characteristic of predatory lenders and lending practices. Id. at 
1265–67 (“The practice of steering prime borrowers to high-cost lenders is an example of 
pricing that is designed to extract harmful rents.”). 
 32. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. Governor Gramlich noted 
that “groups that have disproportionately been prey for unscrupulous creditors are women, 
minorities, and lower-income households. The activities, referred to collectively as predatory 
lending, are a scourge on the mortgage industry.” Gramlich, supra note 19. 
A recent HUD report concluded that subprime lending and its accompanying abuses 
occur much more often in low-income neighborhoods: “In low-income neighborhoods, 
subprime loans accounted for 26 percent of total loans in 1998—compared with only 
11 percent in moderate-income neighborhoods and just 7 percent in upper-income 
neighborhoods. Comparable 1993 figures were 3 percent in low-income neighborhoods and 
1 percent each in moderate-income and upper-income neighborhoods.” UNEQUAL BURDEN, 
supra note 4, at 2. Subprime loans are over three times more likely in low-income 
neighborhoods than high-income neighborhoods. Id. 
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for home loans, which disruptions may decrease the availability of 
credit. 
Unscrupulous lenders often target the elderly because they 
typically have substantial equity in their homes.33 According to the 
AARP, “[n]early 80 percent of older Americans are homeowners, 
and 80 percent of these older homeowners own their homes free and 
clear [of any liens]. . . . [O]ver 60 percent of homeowners age 65 
and older had at least $50,000 in home equity.”34 Elderly 
homeowners are often cash poor, live on fixed incomes, and have 
substantial medical problems, as well as “diminished faculties, and 
isolation that impair their ability to understand loan terms and/or 
make them especially vulnerable to aggressive sales tactics.”35 These 
unique circumstances and vulnerabilities place the elderly in a 
particularly precarious position and often make them easier targets 
for predatory lenders. 
Increased levels of subprime lending in minority communities 
suggest that such communities may be subject to increased lending 
abuses. The United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) reported that five times more subprime 
loans are originated in predominantly African-American 
neighborhoods than white neighborhoods.36 While not all subprime 
lending is predatory, and “subprime lending is an important element 
of our financial system[] because it delivers credit to those that may 
otherwise be unable to obtain credit,” the subprime market “appears 
more susceptible to abusive lending practices than is the prime 
market. A subprime borrower may have few financial options 
 33. See Gramlich, supra note 19 (explaining that “lenders often target elderly 
homeowners, who tend to have the highest levels of equity in their homes”). 
 34. MIKE CALHOUN ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., HOME LOAN PROTECTION 
ACT, A MODEL STATUTE 5 (2001). 
 35. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 72; see also James H. Carr & 
Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: 
ISSUES AND ANSWERS 32–33 (Fannie Mae Foundation ed., 2001) (explaining that predatory 
lenders often target elderly homeowners and “people with limited education who are not adept 
in financial matters and lack the financial sophistication to scrutinize loans,” and discussing 
fraudulent practices used against such groups). 
 36. “In predominantly black neighborhoods, the high-cost subprime lending accounted 
for 51 percent of home loans in 1998—compared with only 9 percent in predominately white 
areas. Comparable 1993 figures were 8 percent in black neighborhoods and 1 percent in white 
neighborhoods.” UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 4, at 2. 
CHI-FIN 7/16/2004 5:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
710 
 
available or less information on loan terms and conditions and less 
opportunity to shop for the best terms and conditions available.”37
In addition to the social problems predatory lending causes, 
predatory lending practices and the regulatory responses they have 
elicited have created market disruptions that may counteract efforts 
to increase home ownership by decreasing the availability of credit. 
In response to state and local regulations that impose restrictions on 
high-cost home loans and attempt to stop abusive practices, some 
lenders have withdrawn from the secondary market where securitized 
home loans are sold and which provides the main source of funding 
for the home mortgage market.38 For instance, in response to the 
enactment of Georgia’s initial Fair Lending Act, which prohibited 
 37. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 51. The Treasury-HUD report 
explained further the connection between subprime lending and predatory practices as follows: 
Evidence of predatory lending practices generally arises from the subprime mortgage 
market. While predatory lending can occur in the prime market, such practices are 
for the most part effectively deterred by competition among lenders, greater 
homogeneity in loan terms and the prime borrowers’ greater familiarity with 
complex financial transactions. In combination, these factors make prime borrowers 
more likely to shop for the best loan terms and less likely to fall victim to predatory 
loans. In addition, many prime lenders are banks, thrifts, and credit unions that are 
subject to extensive oversight and regulation by federal and state governments. 
  The subprime market, in contrast, provides much more fertile ground for 
predatory lending practices. Several factors contribute to this result. 
  The characteristics of many subprime borrowers make them more easily 
manipulated and misled by unscrupulous actors. Many subprime borrowers who 
have had difficulty obtaining credit in the past may underestimate their ability to 
obtain new sources of credit, which may make them more likely to accept the first 
offer of credit they receive, rather than shop for a loan with the best possible terms. 
In addition, subprime borrowers may be more in need of immediate funds due to 
the heightened challenge of meeting household and emergency expenses on their 
lower incomes. 
  Many subprime borrowers live in low-income and minority communities that 
are comparatively underserved by traditional prime lenders. As a result, many of 
these communities suffer from insufficient competition among lenders, so that 
better loan terms may be harder to find, or persons may be unaware of them. 
  The subprime mortgage and finance companies that dominate mortgage 
lending in many low-income and minority communities, while subject to the same 
consumer protection laws, are not subject to as much federal oversight as their 
prime market counterparts—who are largely federally-supervised banks, thrifts, and 
credit unions. The absence of such accountability may create an environment where 
predatory practices flourish because they are unlikely to be detected. 
Id. at 17–18. 
 38. GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MICHAEL STATEN, REGULATION OF SUBPRIME 
MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA’S PREDATORY LENDING LAW 2 
(Credit Research Center, McDonough Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 66, 2002). 
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high-cost loans and imposed liability on lenders that made such loans 
and on those that purchased them, Moody’s Investors Service 
concluded that “including GFLA-covered loans in securitizations 
was too risky, causing lenders to scale back loans in the state and 
leading issuers to remove Georgia loans from securitizations.”39 
Standard and Poor’s also announced that it would no longer rate 
mortgage-backed securities that included Georgia mortgage loans.40 
Government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both 
major purchasers of securitized loans and an important capital source 
for the credit markets, have also taken measures aimed at reducing 
the possibility of purchasing abusive loans and have refused to 
purchase loans that are considered high-cost based upon federal 
standards.41
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE GFLA AND  
OTHER STATE LAWS: THE DOOR IS OPEN 
Although both federal and state regulators and legislators have 
taken aim at predatory practices and attempted to stop them through 
various regulatory devices, controversy still exists about who should 
regulate such practices and to what extent.42 Federal agencies, 
particularly the OCC and the OTS,43 have expressed concern that 
state predatory lending regulation interferes with the ability of 
national financial institutions to make real estate loans and have 
issued determinations that certain state predatory lending laws, 
 39. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46278. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See generally FREDDIE MAC, PROTECTING BORROWERS FROM PREDATORY 
LENDING PRACTICES (2002), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/ 
affordhouse/predlend/apl_fact.html; Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Chairman 
Announces New Loan Guidelines to Combat Predatory Lending Practices (Apr. 11, 2000), 
available at http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/ 2000/0710.html. 
 42. See generally Hearings, supra note 1 (discussing the predatory lending problem and 
various responses to it); Milner, supra note 7 (opposing federal preemption of state predatory 
lending laws, specifically the Georgia Fair Lending Act, and arguing that states have the power 
to regulate national and state banks); GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7 
(preempting the Georgia Fair Lending Act as it applies to federally chartered banks and 
concluding that Georgia’s act interferes with national bank real estate lending powers); Robert 
M. Jaworski, Legislating Against Bad Loans: The State/Local Battleground, 58 BUS. LAW. 
1228, 1242 (2003) (discussing various state and local attempts to regulate predatory loans and 
suggesting that such attempts make it difficult for lenders to operate efficiently). 
 43. The OCC and OTS are charged with regulating nationally chartered banks and 
nationally chartered savings and thrift associations, respectively. 
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notably the GFLA, do not apply to nationally chartered financial 
institutions.44 State and local policymakers, on the other hand, insist 
that federal laws and regulations are not strict enough and have 
enacted new laws and regulations to address the problem.45 Sections 
A and B of this Part discuss the scope of the OCC and OTS 
preemption decisions, respectively, demonstrating that state 
predatory lending legislation similar to that enacted by Georgia can 
no longer address the predatory lending problem effectively. Section 
C then outlines the reasons why exclusive federal regulation in this 
area would not be sufficient to stop the predatory lending problem 
and why, therefore, states should be allowed to regulate in the ways 
suggested in Part IV.46 
A. The OCC’s Preemption of the GFLA 
In spite of states’ concerns and desire to regulate in this area, the 
OCC has become increasingly unwilling to allow state predatory 
lending laws to operate against federally chartered banks. Notably, 
the OCC recently released a preemption order and determination 
that the GFLA does not apply to nationally chartered banks or their 
subsidiaries that operate within Georgia.47
 44. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7; OTS GFLA Preemption Letter, 
supra note 9; OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter, supra note 9. 
 45. See generally Jaworski, supra note 42 (discussing various state and local attempts to 
regulate predatory loans). 
 46. The purpose of this Comment is not to analyze the substantive correctness of the 
OCC and OTS preemption determinations. Although the propriety of those decisions is 
arguable, their correctness is conceded for the purposes of this Comment. This Comment 
simply seeks to provide solutions to the predatory lending problem that can be followed by 
state legislators and regulators without fear of preemption by federal law. The propositions 
made here allow states to continue efforts to stop predatory lending in spite of the OCC’s and 
OTS’s willingness to preempt state statutes aimed at predatory lending, even if the OCC 
determines, based on its recently proposed rulemaking discussed below, that it occupies the 
field of real estate lending regulation with respect to national banks. Because the federal 
government has not and arguably cannot produce a solution that will fully address the 
predatory lending problem, states must seek remedies for the problem, such as those suggested 
here, that cannot be preempted by federal regulators. 
 47. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46281 (concluding that “the 
GFLA does not apply to National City or any other national bank or national bank operating 
subsidiary that engages in real estate lending activities in Georgia”). 
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1. Background 
The GFLA was enacted in 2002 as Georgia’s bid to stop 
predatory lending, which Georgia legislators perceived to be an 
increasing problem.48 It prohibits the financing of single premium 
credit accident, health, or life insurance,49 places limitations on late 
payment charges and fees,50 prohibits “flipping” and provides for 
damages for victims of such practices,51 and places other substantial 
limitations on loans that are defined by the act as “high-cost.”52
In response to the GFLA’s restrictions, National City Bank, a 
nationally chartered bank incorporated in Indiana that was an active 
lender in Georgia, sought a determination from the OCC that the 
 48. Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2002) (amended 
2003). The GFLA was amended in 2003 in response to criticisms from various lending 
interests. 
 49. Id. § 7-6A-3(1). The statute provides: 
No creditor shall make a home loan that finances, directly or indirectly: 
   (A) Any credit life, credit accident, credit health, credit personal property, or 
credit loss-of-income insurance, debt suspension coverage, or debt cancellation 
coverage, whether or not such coverage is insurance under applicable law, that 
provides for cancellation of all or part of a borrower’s liability in the event of loss of 
life, health, personal property, or income or in the case of accident written in 
connection with a home loan; or 
   (B) Any life, accident, health, or loss-of-income insurance without regard to the 
identity of the ultimate beneficiary of such insurance; provided, however, that for the 
purposes of this Code section, any premiums or charges calculated and paid on a 
monthly basis shall not be considered financed directly or indirectly by the creditor. 
Id. 
 50. Id. § 7-6A-3(3). 
 51. Id. § 7-6A-4. Subpart (a) of §7-6A-4 provides: 
No creditor may knowingly or intentionally engage in the unfair act or practice of 
“flipping” a home loan. Flipping a home loan is the consummating of a high cost 
home loan to a borrower that refinances an existing home loan that was 
consummated within the prior five years when the new loan does not provide 
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances 
including, but not limited to, the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the 
cost of the new loan, and the borrower’s circumstances. 
Id. § 7-6A-4(a). Also, damages are available for violations. Id. § 7-6A-4(c). 
 52. Id. § 7-6A-5. Some of the limitations this section places on high-cost loans include 
limitations on prepayment fees (§7-6A-5(1)), on loan terms that call for an increase in interest 
rates after default (§7-6A-5(4)), and on the ability of a lender to make a loan before the 
borrower has received counseling from an approved, independent third-party (§7-6A-5(7)). 
The section also prohibits a creditor from making a high-cost home loan “unless a reasonable 
creditor would believe at the time the loan is consummated that the borrower residing in the 
home will be able to make the scheduled payments” based upon the borrower’s financial 
situation. Id. § 7-6A-5(8). 
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GFLA did not apply to it or its operating subsidiaries.53 In its 
request, National City Bank asserted “that the GFLA is preempted 
under various provisions of federal law and that, accordingly, the 
OCC should conclude that the Georgia law does not apply to it.”54 
After notice to the public and an opportunity for comment on the 
issue, the OCC handed down an order which concluded that the 
substantive provisions of the GFLA do not apply to any nationally 
chartered banking institution operating within Georgia or any 
subsidiary of such a nationally chartered bank.55
2. Rationale for the OCC’s decision 
The OCC found authority to issue the preemption order from 
12 U.S.C. § 371(a), which gives national banks the ability to “make, 
arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens 
on interests in real estate, subject to section 1828(o) of [the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act] and such restrictions and requirements as the 
Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or 
order.”56 The OCC interpreted this grant of power very broadly, 
stating that “[i]n no respect does the statute express or imply that 
the power granted is limited, to some variable degree, by application 
of fifty different state laws.”57 Federal preemption principles and the 
Supremacy Clause do not allow states to “modify a Congressional 
grant of power to national banks by limiting, conditioning, or 
otherwise impermissibly affecting a national bank’s exercise of that 
power.”58
3. Scope of the OCC’s determination 
Based on regulations that the OCC had already properly enacted 
pursuant to § 371, the OCC reasoned further that various types of 
state rules regulating national bank real estate lending do not apply 
to national banks. Specifically, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) lists five areas of 
 53. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46265–66. 
 54. Id. at 46264. 
 55. See id. 
 56. 12 U.S.C. §371(a) (2000). The OCC’s order states that “[t]he Federal statute that 
authorizes national banks’ real estate lending activities, 12 U.S.C. 371, precludes application of 
many provisions of the GFLA to national banks.” GFLA Preemption Determination, supra 
note 7, at 46266. 
 57. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46276. 
 58. Id. at 46266. 
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state laws and limitations that do not apply to national banks in the 
area of mortgage lending, two of which covered GFLA provisions.59 
First, under § 34.4(a)(2),60 GFLA restrictions on balloon payments, 
negative amortization provisions, advance payment provisions, and 
provisions against late fees, regulation of prepayment fees, and 
provisions limiting default rates of interest were all preempted and 
not applicable to national banks.61 Second, § 34.4(a)(3)62 expressly 
preempted GFLA provisions governing limitations on prepayment 
fees, prohibitions on the ability of a lender to accelerate the loan 
absent default by the borrower, and provisions giving borrowers a 
right to cure any default that occurred over the term of the loan.63
The OCC’s order also determined that additional GFLA 
provisions were preempted under the broader preemption principle 
stated in 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b).64 Under this provision, the OCC 
applied a traditional preemption analysis based upon the United 
States Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence.65 Because the 
GFLA conditioned the exercise of § 371 “upon the approval of the 
states,” provisions of the GFLA were preempted.66 The following 
 59. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2003); see also GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 
7, at 46276 (“Section 34.4(a) expressly preempts state laws concerning five areas of fixed-rate 
mortgage lending . . . . Two of the five types of state laws expressly preempted by § 34.4(a)—
state laws concerning the schedule for the repayment of principal and interest (§ 34.4(a)(2)) 
and the term to maturity of the loan (§ 34.4(a)(3))—are relevant here.”). 
 60. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(2) (providing that a state cannot regulate the “schedule for the 
repayment to principal and interest”). 
 61. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46276. 
 62. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(3) (prohibiting states from regulating the “term to maturity of 
the loan”). 
 63. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46276–77. 
 64. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (proclaiming that “[t]he OCC will apply recognized principles 
of Federal preemption in considering whether State laws apply to other aspects of real estate 
lending by national banks”). 
 65. A federal law preempts state law (1) where Congress has expressly preempted state 
law, Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1988); (2) where Congress 
has occupied the field the state seeks to regulate, leaving no room for state legislation; or (3) 
where state law “actually conflicts with federal law,” id.; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
A state law conflicts with federal law when (1) it is impossible to comply with both laws, 
or (2) when the state law produces “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Fla. 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
 66. In coming to this conclusion, the OCC relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34–35 (1996), which interpreted 12 
U.S.C. § 92, a statute that gives national banks the power to act as agents for insurance sales. 
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GFLA provisions impose requirements that a national bank must 
satisfy before exercising lending powers granted to it by Congress 
and are therefore preempted under the § 34.4(b) preemption 
principle: the “financing of credit insurance and debt suspension and 
debt cancellation fees,” “restrictions on refinancings,” the 
requirement that borrowers receive counseling prior to receiving a 
loan, restrictions on underwriting standards, limits on home 
improvement loans, and certain notice requirements.67 Additional 
provisions are preempted because they interfere with the power of 
national banks to make real estate loans, including a provision 
discouraging the use of mandatory arbitration, a provision imposing 
liability on assignees of loans, a requirement that lenders not 
encourage default by borrowers, and a requirement that contractors 
be liable for the loans they produce.68
Finally, the OCC determined that some GFLA provisions are 
preempted under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) and 12 C.F.R. § 
7.1004.69 These sections preempt GFLA provisions prohibiting 
payoff balance and release fees, provisions providing the borrower 
See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46277. The OCC reasoned that “as 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Barnett, the history of national bank powers is one of 
‘interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental “powers” to national banks as grants of 
authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.’” Id. 
at 46274 (quoting Barnett, 517 U.S. at 32). “‘[W]here Congress has not expressly 
conditioned the grant of ‘power’ upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily 
found that no such condition applies.’” Id. at 46275 (quoting Barnett, 517 U.S. at 34). 
The OCC further explained that state laws do not normally apply when they alter or 
condition a national bank’s ability to exercise a power that federal law grants to it. States are 
allowed to regulate areas of contract, debt collection, acquisition and transfer of property, 
taxation, zoning, criminal, and tort law. These types of laws regulate the “legal infrastructure 
that surrounds and supports the conduct of that business. They promote a national bank’s 
ability to conduct business; they do not obstruct a national bank’s exercise of powers granted 
under Federal law.” Id. at 46274–75. The GFLA, on the other hand, regulates the manner and 
content of national bank’s lending activities, which is prohibited under § 371 and recognized 
principles of federal preemption. Id. 
 67. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46277. 
 68. Id. at 46278. 
 69. Id. at 46279. The preemption determination also noted that  
section 24 (Seventh) authorizes a national bank to engage in activities 
that are part of, or incidental to, the business of banking as well as to 
engage in certain specified activities listed in the statute. A bank’s 
authority to provide these services to its customers necessarily 
encompasses the ability to charge a fee for them, and this ability to charge 
a fee for the bank’s services is expressly affirmed in 12 CFR 7.4002(a). 
 Id. 
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the right to cure default, and provisions limiting the rate of interest a 
national bank can charge.70
B. The OTS Preemption Determinations 
In an action similar to but preceding the OCC’s determination 
that the GFLA does not apply to national banks or their operating 
subsidiaries, the OTS also decided that the GFLA does not apply to 
federally regulated savings and thrift associations.71 The OTS 
followed a line of reasoning similar to that of the OCC, explaining 
that, under the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”), Congress 
required the OTS “to provide for the organization, incorporation, 
examination, operation, and regulation of federal savings 
associations.”72 Based on this language, the 
OTS has made clear in its lending regulations its intent to carry out 
this congressional objective by giving federal savings associations 
maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance 
with a uniform federal scheme of regulation. That uniform federal 
scheme occupies the field of regulation for lending activities. The 
comprehensiveness of the HOLA language demonstrates that 
Congress intended the federal scheme to be exclusive, leaving no 
room for state regulation, conflicting or complimentary.73
OTS regulations promulgated under HOLA give federal savings 
associations the ability to make loans under federal law without 
approval or interference from state laws or regulators.74 Thus, 
“GFLA provisions purporting to regulate the terms of credit, loan-
related fees, disclosures, or the ability of a creditor to originate or 
refinance a loan, are preempted by federal law from applying to 
federal savings associations.”75
 70. Id. 
 71. OTS GFLA Preemption Letter, supra note 9, at 1 (“We conclude that GFLA 
provisions purporting to regulate the terms of credit, loan-related fees, disclosures, or the 
ability of a creditor to originate or refinance a loan, are preempted by federal law from applying 
to federal savings associations and their operating subsidies.”). As noted briefly above, the 
OCC has regulatory power over federally chartered banking institutions while the OTS is 
charged with regulating federally chartered savings and thrift associations. Thus, the OCC’s 
preemption determination has application only to federally chartered banks, while the OTS’s 
decision applies to federally chartered savings and thrift associations. 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). 
 74. Id. at 2–3. 
 75. Id. at 2. 
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Just a few months after the issuance of the letter preempting the 
GFLA, the OTS issued a second preemption letter regarding New 
Jersey’s abusive lending practices legislation, the New Jersey Home 
Ownership Security Act.76 Following its reasoning in the GFLA 
preemption order and using identical language, the OTS reaffirmed 
its conclusion that it alone is authorized to impose conditions upon 
federal savings associations’ lending activities.77
C. Why Exclusive Federal Regulation of Predatory  
Lending Is Insufficient 
Because of the broad preemptive scope of these OCC and OTS 
determinations, it is unlikely that state restrictions on predatory 
practices will ever be effective against federal savings and thrift 
associations, thus underscoring the importance of finding ways to 
regulate such practices without interfering with the powers of the 
OCC and OTS to regulate in this area. In addition to these 
preemption determinations, the OCC has also recently released a 
proposed rule that may allow it to completely preempt the field of 
regulation of national bank real estate lending, therefore making it 
impossible for states to take any kind of action against national banks 
operating within their borders.78 While it is true that the OCC and 
OTS preemption determinations do not serve to remove the enacted 
statutes from the states’ books, they do substantially limit the ability 
of states to effectively legislate against abusive lending practices in 
two ways. 
First, the GFLA contains a parity provision that serves to place 
state-chartered banks on the same level as federally chartered banks 
with regard to regulatory strictures.79 If the GFLA provisions are 
 76. See N.J. STAT. ANN § 46.10B-22 (West 2002); OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter, 
supra note 9. 
 77. OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
 78. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 
46119 (proposed Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) (proposing to 
amend C.F.R. parts 7 and 34 “to add provisions clarifying the applicability of state law to 
national banks[,] provisions [which] would identify types of state laws that are preempted, as 
well as types of state laws that generally are not preempted, in the context of national bank 
lending, deposit-taking, and other authorized activities”).  
 79. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-12 (2002) (stating that the provisions of the GFLA will not 
apply to state-chartered financial institutions to the “extent federal law precludes or preempts 
or has been determined to preclude or preempt the application of the provisions of this chapter 
to any federally chartered bank”). 
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preempted on a federal level so that they no longer apply to 
nationally chartered banks, those provisions also do not apply to 
state institutions, which nullifies the law’s effect against state lenders 
as well as national lenders.80 The Georgia Attorney General has 
issued an opinion that the parity provision has taken effect as a result 
of the OCC’s decision; the GFLA, therefore, no longer applies to 
state banks or federal banks, which leaves regulation of abusive 
lending practices unchanged from the way they were prior to 
GFLA’s enactment.81 Similar results may follow for states that enact 
predatory lending statutes with parity provisions that resemble the 
one contained in the GFLA. 
Second, even in situations where state predatory lending laws do 
not contain parity provisions like Georgia’s, and the law remains in 
effect against state banks, OCC preemption means that state 
regulation cannot reach nationally chartered financial institutions. 
OCC preemption and its recent proposed rulemaking, mentioned 
above, which could potentially allow the OCC to occupy the field of 
national bank real estate lending and totally preempt the states from 
regulating national bank real estate lending, it is becoming 
increasingly unlikely that federally chartered financial institutions will 
be subject to state predatory lending measures in the future.82 As the 
problem of predatory lending continues, and federal agencies show a 
willingness to preempt state regulations that affect nationally 
chartered financial institutions, states that have enacted legislation 
similar to Georgia’s are left with fewer options for protecting at-risk 
consumers in the subprime market. 
Furthermore, increased regulation of predatory lending practices 
on the federal level will not adequately protect consumers. Although 
it is possible that federal regulatory agencies and Congress could 
enact additional legislation that applies to nationally chartered 
lending institutions and heighten existing standards under federal 
laws such as HOEPA, TILA, and RESPA,83 significant changes to 
the federal regulatory structure that address predatory lending 
 80. See generally Memorandum from Bo Fears, supra note 13. 
 81. See id. (explaining that the OCC’s preemption order is a preemption determination 
within the meaning of the GFLA’s parity provision, which, according to that provision, leads 
to the conclusion that the GFLA does not apply to state banks). 
 82. See Bank Activities and Operations, supra note 78. 
 83. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 53–54 (outlining HOEPA’s, 
TILA’s, and RESPA’s provisions). 
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practices have not yet been put in place. As noted by the 
Departments of Treasury and HUD throughout their report on the 
topic, the federal scheme for regulating predatory practices contains 
gaps and could be adjusted significantly to provide adequate 
protection.84 States enacted their laws, at least in part, to fill the 
federal gaps, and to date the federal government has made no 
significant changes to address the predatory lending problem. 
 Even if the federal scheme is changed significantly, the problem 
is complicated by the fact that many federal regulations would not 
apply to state banks. The American dual banking system gives the 
authority to regulate a bank to the government that chartered it. 85 
Although many of the federal laws apply to state and federal banks 
alike (such as HOEPA, TILA, and RESPA), the “day-to-day” 
oversight of state-chartered banks is performed by state regulatory 
agencies, while federal banks and other financial institutions are 
regulated solely by the OCC and the OTS. 86 If Congress fails to 
enact additional protections or amend existing laws that are 
applicable to both state and federal banks, and if states do not find 
solutions to the predatory problem that are effective against both 
state and federal lenders, such as those suggested in Part IV, 
predatory practices may remain largely unregulated.  
However, additional action by Congress in this area may not be 
desirable and, at any rate, would not be a panacea. A blanket federal 
solution is not adequate or necessary to solve the problem; each 
jurisdiction requires a distinct response that is tailored to fit the 
situation. The Treasury-HUD Joint Report notes that “the exact 
nature of abusive lending practices often varies from community to 
community,” and concludes that “[s]tate regulators and 
enforcement agencies . . . may be best equipped to understand the 
roots of the problems that exist within their own borders.”87 For 
instance, empirical evidence suggests that the predatory lending 
problem in urban areas with large minority communities is different 
than the problem that exists in areas where such communities do not 
 84. Id. at 69–71, 75, 77, 82, 84–88 (recommending that changes be made to HOEPA, 
TILA, and RESPA to better combat predatory lending abuses). 
 85. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual 
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 677 (1988). 
 86. Id. 
 87. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 83. 
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exist.88 The predatory lending problem in urban, minority 
communities results from the higher rate of subprime lending that 
occurs in those areas.89 By contrast, the problem in Utah, for 
example, is much different. Although many borrowers in Utah are 
being saddled with loans they cannot handle—a common practice 
among predatory lenders—the fraud in that jurisdiction often 
includes participation by the borrowers themselves, who assist 
mortgage brokers in the inflation of incomes and other such 
practices in order to be approved for a home they could not 
otherwise afford.90 Problems faced in various jurisdictions require a 
distinct regulatory response. 
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR STATES IN THE FACE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
Because federal regulatory agencies are prone to preempt state 
efforts, because federal regulation is incomplete, and because blanket 
federal regulation will not fully address the problem, it is important 
that states develop solutions that are effective in stopping predatory 
lending abuses, that do not interfere with federal financial 
institutions’ lending powers, and that do not restrict regulations 
promulgated by federal regulatory agencies pursuant to their 
perceived regulatory powers. This Part provides two suggestions for 
states to curb predatory lending abuses in spite of these obstacles: 
the regulation of mortgage loan sellers and increased prosecution 
through state unfair and deceptive trade practices acts. Although 
other solutions to the predatory lending problem exist, these 
suggestions effectively address the problem and cannot be preempted 
by federal regulatory agencies. 
 88. See supra Part II.B. 
 89. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN CHICAGO: INCOME 
AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING 3, 5 (2000) (finding a higher rate of 
subprime loans being made in certain minority communities than in white communities of 
Chicago and suggesting that these higher rates may lead to an increase in predatory lending 
abuses such as “excessive mortgage fees, interest rates, penalties and insurance charges that 
raise the cost of refinancing by thousands of dollars for individual families”). For other regional 
analyses making similar conclusions, see U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL 
BURDEN IN ATLANTA: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000); 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN BALTIMORE: INCOME AND 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
UNEQUAL BURDEN IN LOS ANGELES: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME 
LENDING (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN NEW YORK: 
INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000). 
 90. Lesley Mitchell, Home Loan Fraud Soaring, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 23, 2003, at E1. 
CHI-FIN 7/16/2004 5:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
722 
 
A. Increased Regulation of Nonbank Loan Sales 
As explained in Part II, the problem of predatory lending arises 
primarily because of unscrupulous, deceptive, and fraudulent sales 
tactics. Sellers of loans, just like any salesperson, have obvious 
incentives to sell loans—namely, they stand to profit. Because of this, 
unregulated nonbank sellers of loans—primarily mortgage brokers—
are a significant part of the predatory lending problem. Inadequate 
or nonexistent regulation, pricing structures that give mortgage 
brokers incentives to sell loans that may not be appropriate for 
particular borrowers, and the facts that brokers do not actually back 
the loan financially and do not take on the credit risk themselves, 
create a significant risk that some mortgage brokers will be tempted 
to engage in predatory lending practices. States can remedy this 
problem, at least partly, by increasing mortgage broker licensing and 
registration requirements and by providing better oversight and 
additional guidance through a regulatory agency. 
1. Nonbank loan sellers are the main source of the predatory lending 
problem 
Mortgage brokers—nonbank loan sellers—facilitate as many as 
two-thirds of all home loans91 and originate fifty percent of subprime 
loans.92 “[T]he growth of this industry has brought with it increasing 
complaints of mortgage fraud and predatory lending.”93 Although 
brokers process and originate most home loans, regulation of 
brokers, which is done at the state level, is uneven or nonexistent in 
some cases. A group of state attorneys general, writing as amicus 
curiae in a recent case regarding an OTS rulemaking, claimed that 
[b]ased on consumer complaints received, as well as investigations 
and enforcement actions undertaken by the Attorneys General, 
predatory lending abuses are largely confined to the subprime 
mortgage lending market and to nondepository institutions. 
 91. GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 7 (“Brokers today touch about 2/3 or more of all 
home loans.”). 
 92. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 39–40 (“According to the 
National Association of Mortgage Brokers, mortgage brokers arrange financing for well over 
half of all home mortgages today. The National Home Equity Mortgage Association also 
reports that about 50 percent of subprime loans are originated through mortgage brokers.”). 
 93. V. Lynne Windham, Alabama’s New Mortgage Brokers Licensing Act, 64 ALA. LAW. 
52, 53 (2003). 
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Almost all of the leading subprime lenders are mortgage companies 
and finance companies, not banks or direct bank subsidiaries.94
Not only do mortgage brokers facilitate most home mortgage 
loans and most subprime loans, the role of a mortgage broker in a 
loan transaction is extensive, giving unscrupulous mortgage brokers 
ample opportunity to engage in predatory practices. Mortgage 
brokers provide a service to those seeking a home loan by counseling 
with them, helping them select and qualify for a loan, shopping for 
the best rate among various lenders, and locking in the terms of the 
loan with the lender.95 Mortgage brokers also provide federally 
mandated disclosures, gather all documentation necessary to get the 
loan through the lender’s underwriting process, order property 
appraisals and borrower credit reports, verify the borrower’s source 
of income, facilitate the loan closing, and see the loan through until 
it is later given over completely to the lender.96 The broker usually 
provides all the necessary services required to generate the loan, with 
the exception of providing the loan funds.97 Typically, once the loan 
is closed and the broker is paid, his relationship with the borrower 
ceases and the lender is involved exclusively with servicing the 
borrower’s loan.98
Because of their extensive involvement in the lending process 
and the relationship of trust and counseling they often have with 
their clients, mortgage brokers are also in a unique position that may 
allow them to take advantage of unwary borrowers. Brokers 
 
 94. OCC Preemption Determination and Order Concerning the Georgia Fair Lending 
Act, Questions and Answers, July 31, 2003, at 1–2 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae State 
Attorneys General, Nat’l Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n v. OTS, Civil Action No. 02-2506 
(GK) (D.D.C. 2003) (regarding predatory lending filed in a litigation concerning an OTS 
rulemaking)). Also,  
predatory lending generally does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it breeds 
in an environment characterized by little competition for traditional 
financial services. Specifically, a community flush with ‘fringe lenders’—
check cashing outlets, pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, title lenders, and 
similar operations—as well as excessive subprime lending, is the 
environment in which predatory lending activities often flourish. 
Carr & Kolluri, supra note 35, at 32. 
 95. GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 7. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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may hide disclosures from borrowers, begin work on a borrower’s 
home and then “bait and switch” with new loan terms before the 
loan is closed, finance fees without borrowers’ knowledge, or lead 
them to believe that they must purchase products such as credit 
insurance in order to close the loan.99
Many third party brokers engage in “aggressive marketing and 
solicitation tactics” that sometimes “rise to the level of fraud or 
illegal deception.”100
Mortgage brokers engage in such practices because of the real 
potential for financial gain. The broker compensation system is such 
that “brokers are paid by borrowers and in many cases, by lenders . . . . 
The total from both sources is their gross profit from a 
transaction.”101 While the amount of the borrower-paid portion of 
the fee is typically ascertainable before or at the closing of the loan, 
the amount the lender pays to the broker is often paid in the form of 
a confusing and nontransparent “yield-spread premium,” which, in 
the end, comes out of the borrower’s pocket as well. A yield-spread 
premium—a fee kicked back from the lender to the broker— “is 
inflated interest on a loan that is used to cover the cost of the 
broker’s fee.”102 One study of such premiums determined that, in the 
prime market, 
[brokers] added an average cost of over $1,100 on each transaction 
in which they were charged. The author found that the most likely 
explanation for the added cost was not added value, nor added 
services. Rather, it is a system which lends itself to price 
discrimination: extra broker-compensation can be extracted from 
less sophisticated consumers, while it can be waived for the few 
who are savvy about the complex pricing practices in today’s 
mortgage market.103
 99. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 24. 
 100. Id. at 79. 
 101. GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 7. 
 102. Anna Beth Ferguson, Note, Predatory Lending: Practices, Remedies and Lack of 
Adequate Protection for Ohio Consumers, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000) (“For 
example, a borrower may qualify for a loan at a 10% annual percentage rate . . . . The broker 
negotiates the loan at a higher rate of 10.25% and then splits the interest premium with the 
lender.”). 
 103. Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 n.17 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney 
General, State of Iowa). 
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Because of the potential of collecting yield-spread premiums from 
unwary borrowers, some mortgage brokers seek out lenders that 
serve their own interests by offering the broker the best 
compensation package rather than looking out for their client’s best 
interests.104
Even when yield-spread premiums are not involved, broker 
compensation is based upon the amount of the loan. In order to 
increase fees and commissions, “brokers have an incentive to 
encourage the borrowers to take out as large a loan as possible.”105 
“The use of brokers has hastened the growth of subprime lending, 
given that brokers have placed some borrowers who would otherwise 
qualify for conventional loans into subprime loans because of the 
greater broker fees from subprime loans.”106 These compensation 
features cause divided loyalties, since the broker should be looking 
out for the interests of her client. “As with most other transactions in 
our increasingly complex society, these borrowers rely on the good 
faith and honesty of the ‘specialist’ to help provide full, accurate, and 
complete information and explanations. Unfortunately, much 
predatory lending is a function of misplaced trust.”107 Although 
mortgage brokers act in many ways as agents for their clients and 
stand in relationships of trust with them, the compensation system 
can lead to unfavorable results for borrowers.108
 104. Eggert, supra note 24, at 553 (2002) (noting that the “use of brokers may lead to 
higher fees charged to borrowers, as brokers could be tempted to seek out the lenders that 
provide the greatest payments to brokers rather than the best rates to borrowers”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 553–54. One source notes that 
A 5 percent fee from a borrower who needs—and wants—just $5000 for a roof 
repair is only $250. But if the broker turns that into a refinance loan, of $40,000, 
further padded with another $10,000 of financed points, fees, and insurance 
premiums, his 5 percent, now $2,500, looks a lot better. 
Hearings, supra note 1, at 57–58 (2001) (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, 
State of Iowa). 
 107. Hearings, supra note 1, at 57–58 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, 
State of Iowa). 
 108. Guttentag describes the relationship between a mortgage broker and her client and 
the problems that can arise from that relationship as follows: 
Mortgage brokers can shop lenders much more effectively than consumers, because 
this is what they do. They are in the market every day. Knowledge of market niches 
is part of their stock in trade. They have relationships with multiple lenders, and are 
therefore positioned to find and shop among the lenders offering particular features. 
And they know the lenders who take 10 days to underwrite a loan and those who 
take one day. 
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In addition to these structural problems, it is often the case that, 
unlike banks and other savings institutions that originate mortgage 
loans, mortgage brokers are not subject to regulation by state or 
federal agencies.109 Regulation of mortgage brokers, which occurs on 
the state level, is often uneven or nonexistent.110 Often, even if 
brokers must be licensed, they are not regulated.111 As of June 2000, 
although thirty-nine states had some mortgage broker registration 
requirement and twenty-nine required proof of net worth, only six 
states required mortgage brokers to pass a competency test.112 
Brokers are often undercapitalized and sometimes simply move from 
state to state after declaring bankruptcy or otherwise facing 
consequences for making abusive loans.113
Furthermore, the mere fact that a broker is licensed does not 
mean that sellers of unfair loans are caught, prosecuted, or held 
accountable for engaging in deceptive and unfair sales tactics. In 
most states, the licensing and enforcement divisions are ineffective 
when it comes to stopping predatory sales tactics employed by 
mortgage brokers. As noted in the Treasury-HUD Joint Report, 
[t]he subprime mortgage and finance companies that dominate 
mortgage lending in many low-income and minority communities, 
while subject to the same consumer protection laws, are not subject 
to as much federal oversight as their prime market counterparts—
who are largely federally-supervised banks, thrifts, and credit 
unions. The absence of such accountability may create an 
  Lenders know that brokers are careful and knowledgeable shoppers while most 
consumers are not. That’s why price differences between lenders are smaller in the 
wholesale market than in the retail market. 
  But mortgage brokers now shop for themselves. Acting as independent 
contractors, they have been a major part of the problem. 
  The key to effective reform of the home loan market is to mandate that 
mortgage brokers act as agents of borrowers, and that the fees for their services be 
explicit. 
GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 24–25. 
 109. Eggert, supra note 24, at 554 (“Even in the majority of states that regulate 
mortgage brokers, the scope and intensiveness of that regulation is often modest compared to 
that directed at other lending institutions.”). 
 110. Id. (“The amount of regulation of mortgage brokers varies dramatically by state . . . . 
Some states have virtually no regulation.”). 
 111. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 18. 
 112. See id. at 79, Table 6.1. 
 113. See id. at 81 (citing evidence of “thinly capitalized brokers, contractors and lenders 
who abused consumers, declared bankruptcy, moved to new states and began operating there 
under different names”). 
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environment where predatory practices flourish because they are 
unlikely to be detected.114
2. What form should state regulation of mortgage brokers take? 
The inadequacy of state regulation of mortgage brokers and 
other loan sellers demonstrates that state policymakers should take 
thoughtful measures to combat predatory practices. This section 
suggests some practical solutions that states should consider when 
enacting regulation targeted at predatory mortgage brokers and 
other predatory loan sellers.115 States can decrease the rate of abusive 
lending occurrences among loan brokers by heightening licensing 
and registration standards for mortgage brokers (including increasing 
loan officer/originator fitness and competency requirements, 
requiring proof of adequate capitalization, and increasing or 
implementing bonding and insurance requirements) and by creating 
an agency that outlines prohibited acts and contract provisions and 
enforces violations of such guidelines.116
 114. Id. at 18. As demonstrated in this section, mortgage brokers and other nonbank 
loan originators have the opportunity and motive to commit predatory lending abuses. They 
are also not subject to extensive oversight, which makes it unlikely that such abuses, when they 
occur, will be detected or stopped. However, it is true that mortgage brokers are not the only 
source of the predatory lending problem and that there is no way to prove or determine exactly 
what percentage of predatory lending mortgage brokers account for. Rather than suggesting 
that all predatory lending is promulgated by mortgage brokers (which suggestion would be 
untrue and unfair to legitimate mortgage brokers), this Comment merely attempts to show 
that it is highly likely that a significant number of predatory lending abuses come from the 
subprime mortgage broker market and that better regulation of mortgage broker sales practices 
will, therefore, help reduce the occurrence of such lending abuses. As explained, a vast number 
of mortgages go through the hands of unregulated mortgage brokers, many of whom may 
have powerful incentives to engage in lending abuses. 
 115. Each state should carefully analyze the breadth and depth of the abusive lending 
problem faced by consumers in their state and develop a solution that is tailored to address the 
problem. 
 116. Because every form of regulation imposes costs upon the regulator and upon the 
actors subject to it, the costs and benefits of any action must be weighed. Actions taken to 
regulate mortgage brokers should be clearly directed at the problem and impose as few costs 
upon brokers as possible. As stated in the HUD-Treasury report, “[i]mposing additional 
regulations on brokers, contractors and appraisers will impose costs on all of these parties, not 
just those who engage in abusive practices. New regulations should seek to protect vulnerable 
consumers, while not imposing undue compliance burdens on honest market participants.” 
TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 81. Also, although it is true that many states 
have laws in place, aimed at regulating mortgage brokers, that accomplish one or more of the 
tasks suggested in this part, most states can work to regulate mortgage broker activity more 
efficiently and in a way that better protects consumers. 
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a. Licensing and registration of mortgage brokers. Although several 
states require that mortgage brokers and other loan sellers obtain a 
license or register with the state before originating loans, many do 
not.117 Aware of this problem in his state, the President of the Illinois 
Mortgage Bankers Association commented, “It’s too easy to get into 
this business. . . . It’s not good that you could be selling paint at 
Sears one week and originating loans the next.”118 Because of the 
importance of this issue, and the substantial investment borrowers 
make when purchasing a home, it is imperative that “[r]esidential 
mortgage loan originators who work directly with the public . . . be 
educated, honest, and professional.”119 Laws must seek to ensure 
moral and professional competence among those applying to become 
mortgage brokers. To be effective, licensing laws should require that 
every mortgage seller be individually licensed and registered.120 States 
should conduct background investigations to test the ethical fitness 
of loan originators.121 Licenses should not be issued to loan officers 
 117. GOODWIN PROCTER, LLP,  STATE LAWS PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ABUSIVE 
AND PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES 24 (2001), available at http://www.mbaa.org/ 
industry/reports/01/goodwin_0720.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) (noting that only ten 
states require loan officers to be licensed or registered with the state, including California, 
Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin). 
Alabama also enacted mortgage broker licensing legislation in 2001. ALA. CODE § 5-25-1 et 
seq. (2002). 
 118. Loan Battle Brews Anew: Subprime Lenders, Activists Set to Spar Again in Springfield, 
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Dec. 11, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 8130226 (quoting Ben Israel, 
president of the Illinois Mortgage Bankers Association). 
 119. NAT’L ASS’N OF MORTGAGE BROKERS, MODEL STATE STATUTE INITIATIVE: 
LICENSING, PRE-LICENSURE EDUCATION AND CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR ALL 
ORIGINATORS 6 (2002) [hereinafter NAMB INITIATIVE]. The National Association of 
Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) noted the importance of licensing and education requirements and 
cited such as a goal behind its recent Model State Statute Initiative on the topic. Id. (“NAMB 
firmly believes that part of the solution to consumer abuse and predatory lending is mandatory 
licensing and education of all residential loan originators.”). The initiative is designed to “help 
reduce the incidence of predatory lending and improve the overall competency of the 
industry.” Id. 
 120. See id. at 5. 
 121. See id. at 7 (suggesting that all applicants for a mortgage broker license “submit to a 
background investigation of, at a minimum, criminal records, and employment history”). 
Alabama requires that applicants for a mortgage broker license submit six letters of reference 
concerning the applicant’s experience and reputation. ALA. CODE § 5-25-5(c)(3)–(4) (2002). 
The Alabama law requires that the state conduct a background investigation and that the state 
“may not license any applicant unless it is satisfied that the applicant may be expected to 
operate its mortgage brokerage activities in compliance with the laws of this state.” Id. § 5-25-
6(b). 
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who have been convicted of a felony or crimes involving fraud, who 
have been involved in unethical activities, or who have had a financial 
services license revoked due to past unethical conduct.122 Loan 
officers should be required to pass competency tests that require 
them to demonstrate the capacity to effectively counsel consumers,123 
that test understanding of principles of mortgage ethics and 
mortgage law, and that otherwise require them to demonstrate 
familiarity with industry standards and rules.124 These fitness and 
competency requirements should be imposed upon the principals of 
mortgage companies as well as upon loan officers working for such 
companies.125
In addition to increasing licensing requirements and requiring 
competency tests, mortgage companies should be required to show 
that they are financially sound.126 Mortgage companies should be 
 122. In Nevada, the licensing authority can refuse to issue a license to any mortgage 
company that employs individuals who have been “convicted of, or entered a plea of nolo 
contendere to” any “felony relating to the practice of mortgage agents,” any “crime involving 
fraud, misrepresentation or moral turpitude,” or anyone who “[h]ad a financial services license 
or registration suspended or revoked within the immediately preceding 10 years.” NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 645B.0243 (2002). Violations of Nevada’s mortgage broker licensing law can result in 
suspension or revocation of a license as well as fines of up to $10,000 per violation. Id. § 
645B.670. 
Alabama will not issue a mortgage broker license to any applicant with a principal officer 
who has been convicted of a felony or any crime involving breach of trust, fraud, or dishonesty. 
ALA. CODE §5-25-6(c). 
 123. NAMB INITIATIVE, supra note 119, at 9. Nevada law facilitates similar objectives by 
placing the burden upon lenders to ensure that loan officers and mortgage sellers working for 
them comply with the law and otherwise understand principles of ethical and sound lending 
practices. NEV. REV. STAT. § 645B.460. 
 124. As one commentator notes, 
A person who has studied the subject and the law should be able to 
competently interact with the public and cannot justifiably claim 
ignorance of permitted and prohibited practices. Testing industry 
participants also raises the perceived level of professionalism associated 
with the undertaking, which puts mortgage lenders and brokers more on 
a par with securities brokers, real estate brokers and others involved in 
offering complex financial products to the public. 
GOODWIN PROCTER, supra note 117, at 27. 
 125. “[E]stablishing minimum educational requirements as well as requiring continuing 
education will substantially increase each Residential Loan Originator’s awareness of their [sic] 
responsibility and duty to give consumers fair and honest service.” NAMB INITIATIVE, supra 
note 119, at 10. 
 126. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 81 (noting evidence of “thinly 
capitalized brokers, contractors and lenders who abused consumers, declared bankruptcy, 
moved to new states and began operating there under different names”). 
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required to provide proof of adequate capitalization and should meet 
minimum bonding and insurance requirements.127 Without such 
requirements, 
[a] mortgage broker could easily be judgment-proof in the states 
that do not require them to be bonded or to maintain a minimum 
capital. Such mortgage brokers are free to disappear if they are 
sued. Disreputable brokers have been known to declare 
bankruptcy, move to another state, and begin business anew under 
assumed names.128
These financial fundamentals would better protect consumers 
and ensure that consumers have something against which they can 
recover in the event of a lending abuse in which they are damaged. 
 
b. Set forth prohibited acts and contract provisions and enforce 
violations. Mortgage lenders should be subject to the supervision of a 
state regulatory agency that has the power to provide guidelines and 
enforce them. State enforcement agencies should have power to 
perform occasional audits to ensure that individual loan sellers and 
mortgage companies are complying with state and federal laws and 
regulations.129 An enforcement agency should have the power to set 
forth ethical standards, require licensees to obtain continuing 
education regarding industry standards, and alert them to developing 
problems in the industry.130 Mortgage broker licensing statutes 
should allow the agency to revoke individual licenses for violations of 
standards in addition to licenses issued to mortgage companies, thus 
removing predatory lenders from the market.131 Penalties for 
 127. The Alabama Mortgage Brokers Licensing Act requires that applicants for a 
mortgage license have a minimum capital net worth of $25,000. ALA. CODE § 5-25-5(c)(2) 
(2002). 
 128. Eggert, supra note 24, at 556. 
 129. The Alabama Act gives enforcement of the Act to the Supervisor of the Bureau of 
Loans (part of the State Banking Department). ALA. CODE § 5-25-16. Mortgage broker 
licensees are subject to investigations by examination of their business records. Id. § 5-25-9(b). 
 130. The NAMB Initiative suggests that “[e]very residential mortgage originator, 
whether a Residential Loan Officer or Principal Mortgage Owner, shall, upon renewal of an 
existing license, submit proof of satisfactory completion of a course of study.” NAMB 
INITIATIVE, supra note 119, at 9. Alabama’s Act requires mortgage broker licensees to obtain 
twelve hours of continuing education. ALA. CODE § 5-25-5(b)(6). 
 131. Violations of the Alabama Act may subject a licensee to suspension or revocation of 
his mortgage broker license, ALA. CODE § 5-25-14(a), the assessment of civil penalties, id. § 5-
25-16(b), and could subject him to criminal penalties, id. §5-25-17. 
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violations and predatory practices would include fines and increased 
supervision, as well as prohibitions on collecting fees or requirements 
that fees obtained through predatory transactions be refunded. 
B. Increased Enforcement of State Deceptive Trade Practices Acts 
In addition to improving regulation of mortgage brokers and 
other loan sellers at the state level, states can combat predatory 
lending practices through increased enforcement of existing 
deceptive and unfair trade practices acts. Many states have enacted 
legislation, modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC 
Act”), aimed at stopping deceptive and unfair trade practices.132 
These state acts generally protect consumers against a broad range of 
undesirable, deceptive, and coercive practices.133 In many states, 
violations can only be prosecuted by state agencies, while others 
expressly provide private rights of action for violations.134
State attorneys general have used state deceptive trade practices 
acts to combat predatory practices.135 In the most notable instance, 
several states have used their acts against First Alliance Mortgage 
Company (“FAMCO”), whose 
 132. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598.0903–598.0999; ch. 598A (2002); see also 15 
U.S.C. § 45 (2000). 
 133. For example, Nevada Revised Statutes sections 598.0915–598.0925 list practices 
that are defined as deceptive. Specifically, section 598.0915(15) states that a person who 
“[k]nowingly makes any . . . false representation in a transaction” engages in a deceptive trade 
practice, subjecting him to liability under the act. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0915(15). This 
language could reasonably be interpreted to include representations made in lending 
transactions. 
 134. For example, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington all 
provide some sort of private right of action under consumer protection statutes addressing 
unfair and deceptive trade practices. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-2, 480-13 (2002); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 205-A (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638 (2001); 73 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2003); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 2003); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (West 2003); Bodin v. B. & L. Furniture Co., 601 P.2d 
848 (Or. Ct. App. 1979). Florida allows anyone to seek injunctive relief under its Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, but only allows consumers, and not competitors, to seek money 
damages. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211 (West 2003); Big Tomato v. Tasty Concepts, Inc., 
972 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Minnesota allows for injunctive relief under its Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act, but no private damages actions are allowed. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
325D.45 (West 2003); Mayo Clinic v. Mayo’s Drug and Cosmetic, Inc., 113 N.W.2d 852 
(Minn. 1962); Simmons v. Modern Aero, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 135. Hearings, supra note 1, at 53 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, 
State of Iowa). 
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employees were rigorously trained as to how to disguise their 20-
point charges through a sales script full of tricky and misleading 
information designed to mislead consumers into thinking that the 
charges were much lower than they were. This sales script was 
dubbed “The Monster Track.” Attorneys General in Minnesota, 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Florida, California, New York, and Arizona 
have taken action against the company, along with the Department 
of Financial Institutions in Washington State. (In the wake of all 
the litigation and enforcement actions, the company filed 
bankruptcy.)136
Other jurisdictions have also allowed deceptive trade practices acts to 
be used against lenders for various actions that were considered 
deceptive or unfair under their states’ respective acts.137
Following the lead of the attorneys general in the FAMCO case 
and others, state regulators and prosecutors can bring actions under 
state trade practice laws in order to combat predatory practices 
employed by all types of lending interests, including mortgage 
brokers and federally and state-chartered banks. State deceptive and 
unfair trade practices acts can be enforced against national and state 
banks alike, regardless of the scope of the OCC’s proposed 
 136. Id. at 61. 
 137. See In re Russell, 72 B.R. 855, 870–72 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection law to the conduct of a 
commercial lender); Haw. Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 11 P.3d 1, 15 (Haw. 2000) 
(holding that claims regarding the interest rate of a loan made by a credit union fell within the 
ambit of the Hawaii unfair practices act and could be brought under that act); People v. N. Ill. 
Mortgage Co., 559 N.E.2d 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (reversing order for summary judgment in 
favor of a mortgage company that was sued by the state for conduct amounting to a pattern of 
unfair or deceptive acts under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Uniform Deceptive Practices 
Acts); Baird v. Norwest Bank, 843 P.2d 327, 334 (Mont. 1992) (holding that the Montana 
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law applies to the conduct of a commercial 
lender); Chavers v. Fleet Bank, No. PC 00-5237, 2001 WL 506776, at *8 (R.I. Super. Apr. 
20, 2001) (upholding an action under the Rhode Island Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act by a consumer against Fleet Bank, a federally chartered bank, for employing “bait and 
switch” tactics in soliciting credit card accounts); Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Salinas, 999 
S.W.2d 846, 851–52 (Tex. App. 1999) (upholding a judgment under the Texas Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act against lender for deceptive acts in connection with home loan financing); 
Wieler v. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex., 887 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that 
“unconscionable acts in connection with a foreclosure can support recovery” under the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Forth Worth Mortgage Corp. v. Abercrombie, 835 S.W.2d 
262, 266 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding that a lender’s act of canceling a borrower’s mortgage 
protection policy and substituting it for one with less benefits was deceptive and subjected it to 
liability under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Investors, Inc. v. Hadley, 738 S.W.2d 
737 (Tex. App. 1987) (allowing an action against a lender under the Texas Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act). 
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rulemaking or any other preemptive action federal regulatory 
agencies take.138 As explained in Part III.A, the OCC reasoned in its 
 138. The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that the Connecticut Uniform Trade 
Practices Act (CUTPA) is applicable to banks in Normand Josef Enterprises v. Connecticut 
National Bank, 646 A.2d 1289, 1306 (Conn. 1994). In that case, Connecticut National Bank 
argued that CUTPA did not apply to it because the statute was similar to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, which exempts banks from enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission of 
the FTC Act. Id. at 1300–01. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, however, reasoned that the 
fact of bank exemption “from the Federal Trade Commission Act does not establish their 
exemption from CUTPA.” Id. at 1301. The court further reasoned that  
[w]hile banks are arguably comprehensively regulated under federal law, even 
national banks, which are instrumentalities of the federal government, have always 
been subject to the laws of the state in which they do business. State laws are 
preempted only when their operation expressly conflicts with the laws of the United 
States. 
Id. at 1304–05. Finally, the court explained that “[t]he mere existence of generic state and 
federal banking regulations does not exclude CUTPA coverage. CUTPA is applicable even 
when its regulatory scheme overlaps that authorized by another statute or regulation.” Id. at 
1305. Thus, the CUTPA was applicable against banks and can be enforced against banks in 
spite of the general scheme of federal regulation of banks. 
The court in Normand Josef Enterprises cited a long list of cases from other jurisdictions 
that have likewise held that their state’s deceptive and unfair trade practices or consumer 
protection statutes are applicable to banks, including cases from California, Illinois, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, and Washington. See, e.g., Heastie v. Cmty. 
Bank of Greater Peoria, 727 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying an Illinois 
consumer fraud statute); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 514 (Cal. 1985); 
Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 56–57 (Cal. 1979); First Nat’l Bank of Anthony 
v. Dunning, 855 P.2d 493, 498 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Raymer v. Bay State Nat’l Bank, 424 
N.E.2d 515, 521 (Mass. 1981); Attorney Gen. v. Mich. Nat’l Bank, 312 N.W.2d 405, 414 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981), rev’d in part, 325 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. 1982); Baird v. Norwest Bank, 
843 P.2d 327, 333–34 (Mont. 1992); Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, 753 P.2d 346, 
348 (N.M. 1988); Pa. Bankers Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 427 A.2d 730, 732–33 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1981). Normand Josef Enterprises also cited the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Vogt v. Seattle-First National Bank, which noted that 
Although the Comptroller of the Currency has regulatory and supervisory authority 
over national banks, that authority alone does not result in exemption under the 
Consumer Protection Act for Seafirst in this case. Its conduct as trustee is not 
preempted by federal regulation and thus is subject to the Consumer Protection 
Act. 
817 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Wash. 1991). 
Since the decision in Norman Josef Enterprises, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (“OCC”) has determined that although the Federal Trade Commission has no 
power to enforce the FTC Act against national banks, it does have the authority to do so. See 
Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, OCC Advisory Letter AL 2002-3 (Mar. 
22, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc. However, the 
mere fact that the OCC has decided to enforce violations of the act in this area does not mean 
that state acts are preempted and that states no longer have the ability to enforce their 
deceptive trade practices acts against the state banks. As noted by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, banks are still subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which they do business. The 
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order preempting the GFLA that the OCC had been given broad 
powers to regulate federally chartered banks’ real estate lending 
powers under 12 U.S.C. § 371(a).139 National bank powers are 
limited to those given them explicitly by Congress, and Congress has 
not given them the power to engage in acts and practices that violate 
the FTC Act or are otherwise fraudulent.140 Enforcement by states of 
substantively similar state statutes does not interfere with any 
properly-given national bank real estate lending power and therefore 
cannot be stopped through federal preemption.141
The fact that state deceptive trade practice laws may not be 
identical to the FTC Act also should not hinder states’ ability to 
prosecute violations without interference from federal regulators. 
Although state deceptive trade practice acts are often not identical to 
the FTC Act, they are, in most cases, substantively the same; where 
enforcement by states of substantively similar provisions where states follow the guidance 
provided by the FTC and OCC in their advisory letters cannot be said to conflict with any law 
or purpose of the United States and therefore should not be preempted. Rather than 
conflicting with federal law, such continued enforcement by states complements the federal 
scheme. 
 139. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000). Section 371(a) gives national banks the ability to 
“make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in 
real estate, subject to section 1828(o) of [the Federal Deposit Insurance Act] and such 
restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation 
or order.” Id. 
 140. It is true that enforcing state deceptive trade practices laws may affect the “manner 
or content” of national bank real estate lending, at least indirectly—the OCC indicated in its 
GFLA preemption order that such laws are preempted. However, the fact remains that 
Congress has not given national banks the power to engage in illegal or deceptive lending 
practices. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000) (listing national bank powers); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934) (“The measure of [national bank] powers is the statutory 
grant; and powers not conferred by Congress are denied. For the act under which national 
banks are organized constitutes a complete system for their government.”) (citations omitted). 
Instituting enforcement actions to stop such practices does not interfere with any lawful or 
proper power given to national banks under federal law. 
 141. The Treasury-HUD Joint Report recognized the value of enforcement through state 
deceptive trade practices acts: 
Through the regional Task Force forums, HUD and Treasury learned that the exact 
nature of abusive lending practices often varies from community to community. 
State regulators and enforcement agencies should give increased focus to the 
growing problem of fraudulent, unfair and deceptive practices in the mortgage 
lending market, as they may be best equipped to understand the roots of the 
problems that exist within their own borders. 
TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 83. 
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they are not, they can be amended to mirror the FTC Act.142 States 
can enforce deceptive trade practice acts for lending violations as is 
done in other contexts in which states enforce federal lending law. 
For example, Connecticut has restated and adopted TILA “almost 
verbatim,” and Arizona has made it a state law violation to infringe 
upon the terms of “RESPA or the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 
which includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act, ECOA, and the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, as well as TILA.”143 West Virginia 
makes any violation of a “federal law regulating mortgage loan 
transactions” a violation of West Virginia law.144 Similar action can 
be taken in those states where mini-FTC Acts have not been adopted 
or in instances where amendments are necessary to bring state unfair 
trade practices laws in line with federal laws. 
Because state acts are usually substantively similar and typically 
contain much of the same language as the FTC Act, states can use 
federal guidance in determining what sorts of deceptive and 
predatory lending practices can be combated under state unfair trade 
practices acts. In particular, states should follow OCC guidance in 
determining what is unfair and deceptive and should therefore 
subject mortgage sellers to prosecution under state deceptive trade 
practices acts. In a recent letter, the OCC reasoned that certain 
deceptive loan practices, including loan flipping and equity stripping, 
are deceptive and unfair under the FTC Act and will be prosecuted 
under the Act.145 This guidance is valuable to states because it assists 
state enforcement officers in determining what types of action can be 
prosecuted without concern for preemption by the OCC, in 
developing standards for which practices should be considered 
violations of their acts, and in deciding when to bring an action. 
Specifically, the OCC stated that lending practices are deceptive if: 
[f]irst, there is a representation, omission, act, or practice that is 
likely to mislead; [s]econd, the act or practice would be likely to 
mislead a reasonable consumer (a reasonable member of the group 
targeted by the acts or practices in question); and [t]hird, the 
 142. Like state statutes, the FTC Act is broad and serves to protect consumers and 
businesses from unfair and deceptive trade practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). 
 143. GOODWIN PROCTER, supra note 117, at 56. 
 144. Id. at 57. 
 145. OCC Predatory Abuses Guidelines Letter, supra note 25, at 2, 4–6. 
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representation, omission, act, or practice is likely to mislead in a 
material way.146
A practice is considered unfair under the FTC Act if: “[f]irst, the 
practice causes substantial consumer injury, such as monetary harm; 
[s]econd, the injury is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer 
or to competition; and [t]hird, the injury caused by the practice is 
one that consumers could not reasonably have avoided.”147 Because 
the terms “deceptive” and “unfair” are defined somewhat broadly 
under this standard, states can tailor solutions to address the specific 
types of abusive practices that are occurring within their jurisdictions. 
Finally, in order to ensure that actions brought under state 
deceptive trade practices acts have a deterrent effect on loan sellers 
and those actors engaging in predatory practices, state lawmakers 
should enact provisions giving consumers a private right of action 
where one is not explicitly given.148 Many state deceptive trade 
practices acts explicitly allow a private right of action, but others do 
not.149 Because states often do not have the necessary resources to 
investigate every violation and abuse of state laws, state lawmakers 
should amend state acts to allow private rights of action. Also, some 
states do not include credit as a good and lending as a service that is 
covered under state deceptive trade practices acts.150 In such 
instances, the necessary amendments should be made in order to 
ensure adequate enforcement. Enforcement by states of deceptive 
 146. Id. at 4. 
 147. Id. 
 148. The FTC Act does not allow any private right of action, but instead leaves 
enforcement up to the Federal Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000) (giving the 
Federal Trade Commission power “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from 
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce”). 
 149. See supra note 134. 
 150. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, stated:  
Some State UDAP statutes do not include credit as a “good or service” to 
which the Act applies, or lenders may be exempted from the list of 
covered entities. Some State statutes prohibit “deceptive” practices, but 
not unfair practices. In my State, we have no private right of action for 
our UDAP statute, magnifying the impact of the problem of inadequate 
resources for public enforcement. Other claims which might apply to a 
creditors’ [sic] practices may be beyond the jurisdictional authority given 
to public agencies. 
Hearings, supra note 1, at 53, 62 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of 
Iowa). 
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and unfair trade practices acts would therefore be an effective 
deterrent that would not interfere with national bank lending powers 
but would allow the states to tailor the remedy to fit the problems 
that they are facing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment illustrates that abusive and predatory lending 
practices continue to be a significant problem in many parts of the 
country. State and federal regulators are at odds in determining how 
to deal with the problem. The OCC’s recent order preempting the 
GFLA, its recent rulemaking which may result in the OCC 
occupying the field of regulation of national real estate lending, and 
the OTS’s preemption orders on the same topic provide evidence 
that it is unlikely that states will be able to enact legislation 
prohibiting specific lending terms and conditions that will be 
effective against federally chartered banks. Federal regulatory 
agencies seem willing to preempt any law that interferes with a 
nationally chartered financial institution’s power to make real estate 
loans. 
It is therefore important that states develop remedies that do not 
run afoul of OCC and OTS preemption principles. Because a 
significant portion of predatory practices are engaged in by nonbank 
sellers of loans that are regulated by states, state legislators should 
develop laws that target sellers of loans, such as heightened licensing 
requirements for loan originators, and the creation of state agencies 
that enforce such requirements and punish lending abuses. 
Additionally, states can effectively stop predatory practices through 
enforcement of state unfair and deceptive trade practices acts against 
federal and state-chartered financial institutions. These solutions can 
be taken without impinging upon federal real estate lending powers. 
Using these tactics, states may prevent predatory lending abuses 
without interfering with national banking powers. 
 
Christopher R. Childs 
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